Blogging from a cultural historian Follow me on Twitter @AngloAmCulture
09 May 2007
Leftovers
When I first came to Britain, as a student, in 1978, the scars of the Second World War were still in plain view. "Bombsites" were the playgrounds of inner-city youth. Shelters still stood in people's back yards. Then, when I moved here in the mid 1980s, you'd hear every other year or so about traffic problems caused by the discovery of an unexploded bomb. I think the last one in London was in the mid 1990s. Occasionally, a note would crop up in the newspaper about a farmer uncovering some weapon of war on the Continent. However, it's worth remembering that there are other places to find relics of the war.
08 May 2007
Jeanne d'Orléans
Today is the anniversary of Joan of Arc raising of the siege or Orléans, a key military event that has been overshadowed to some extent by subsequent accomplishments. There's an interesting summary of the context and events of the entire siege here.
07 May 2007
Falklands Memories - Introduction
I was going to write a short note about the loss of HMS Sheffield on the 25th anniversary, but the more I poked and prodded with the text, the more I realized that it wouldn't do the subject of the Falklands justice. This little war of 1982 was the subject of a page-long review article in The Guardian this weekend. Of the four books reviewed, I have encountered three of the authors in my time in publishing. I've also met a couple of other people with links to the conflict, one as a direct participant, the other someone who had just left the service when the war came.
I wanted to call this post "The Comic Book War", but I thought it would be misunderstood. No war is a comical affair. My point was that the war played a role on the Home Front equivalent to those comic books such as the Commando series. The "Argies" were the bad guys, although perceived more like Second World War Italians than Nazis. We tuned into the TV each night to see retired officers discuss various options over a sand table, with a man named Snow. Naturally, since civilians tend to overlook logistics, and retired offices play their roles in disinformation campaigns, most of the speculations were very wrong-headed.
But what stands out most for me about the Falklands War was that it was the only truly popular war I've ever experienced in my lifetime. People of a certain age who had been through the Second World War, those who at the time of the Falklands were just under 60, couldn't see the point of the conflict. Everybody else in Britain seemed to determined to see this thing through, even welcomed it. Compare that with the Vietnam War, which divided my school and my family; the Gulf War of 1991, which I demonstrated against; the Yugoslav War of 1999, which most people I met thought a waste of money and effort; and the ongoing Iraq War, before which my wife and children took part in the March of a Million through London, and you'll see what I mean.
However, having said that, I must recount my favorite story related to the Falklands. Just after word of the Argentine invasion reached us, the man in whose house I was living came back from work. He had been expressing his unhappiness with the potential loss of many young men's lives for some scraps of turf in the South Atlantic with work colleagues. One of them, a youngish office junior who frequently featured in his stories from work, protested: "I don't see what business they have up there anyway." Puzzled, because he would have expected the circumlocution to be "down there", not up, the much older man probed further into this young lady's notions. It quickly became apparent that this young lady thought the Falklands Islands were somewhere in the vicinity of the Faeroes.
I wanted to call this post "The Comic Book War", but I thought it would be misunderstood. No war is a comical affair. My point was that the war played a role on the Home Front equivalent to those comic books such as the Commando series. The "Argies" were the bad guys, although perceived more like Second World War Italians than Nazis. We tuned into the TV each night to see retired officers discuss various options over a sand table, with a man named Snow. Naturally, since civilians tend to overlook logistics, and retired offices play their roles in disinformation campaigns, most of the speculations were very wrong-headed.
But what stands out most for me about the Falklands War was that it was the only truly popular war I've ever experienced in my lifetime. People of a certain age who had been through the Second World War, those who at the time of the Falklands were just under 60, couldn't see the point of the conflict. Everybody else in Britain seemed to determined to see this thing through, even welcomed it. Compare that with the Vietnam War, which divided my school and my family; the Gulf War of 1991, which I demonstrated against; the Yugoslav War of 1999, which most people I met thought a waste of money and effort; and the ongoing Iraq War, before which my wife and children took part in the March of a Million through London, and you'll see what I mean.
However, having said that, I must recount my favorite story related to the Falklands. Just after word of the Argentine invasion reached us, the man in whose house I was living came back from work. He had been expressing his unhappiness with the potential loss of many young men's lives for some scraps of turf in the South Atlantic with work colleagues. One of them, a youngish office junior who frequently featured in his stories from work, protested: "I don't see what business they have up there anyway." Puzzled, because he would have expected the circumlocution to be "down there", not up, the much older man probed further into this young lady's notions. It quickly became apparent that this young lady thought the Falklands Islands were somewhere in the vicinity of the Faeroes.
01 May 2007
Antony Preston
I discovered that Antony Preston has been provided with a Wikipedia entry. I first saw Antony Preston in the summer of 2002, when he came into the offices of Conway Maritime Press, then part of Chrysalis Books. Eventually, I had the opportunity of editing his last book, The World's Worst Warships, which was published, very late, in 2002. The picture research was done mostly by me, although Antony found a few of the pictures in the old Conway Maritime archive, and we went through all the images before the book went into design. I also introduced a howling error in the book, which I never had the chance to apologize to Antony for making. It was a very stressful time, as the designer seemed more interested in ordering new Vans than ensuring the typography was correct and all the necessary retouching done to the photographs, and I was standing in for the entire editorial department who had gone off on vacation. Antony himself was at this time in hospital, where I visited him a couple of times. He was so bored he was grateful to accept the proofs to distract him from the tedium of a hospital stay. He's the sort of niche author whom I think deserves a Wikipedia entry. But they really ought to spell his Christian name correctly!
25 April 2007
Duxford's DH-9
The Imperial War Museum at Duxford has unveiled a restored DeHaviland DH-9 according to the local press. What I found of especial interest was that, according to the article, the museum had to sell an Me-163 Komet in order to finance the purchase and restoration of the DH-9.
24 April 2007
Chronicle of War
I received my author's copies yesterday. I think it looks good. I've also picked up a copy of Harry Pearson's account of growing up (and being grown up) with stories of war not just in the background but enveloping one like a mist rolling in from the sea.
18 April 2007
More Caption Controversy
The Canadian War Museum's exhibition on the work of the RCAF in Bomber Command has come in for some complaints from veterans. Unfortunately, the article doesn't quote the offending text at any length, so one must be more circumspect in taking sides. However, in this case my sympathies lie with the museum. The grim fact of strategic bombing operations during the war is that they killed many German civilians who for one reason or another found themselves in the vicinity of legitimate war targets. (Although at some point I believe Bomber Command regarding housing as a legitimate war target.) In the same way that chemical and biological weapons have been effectively criminalized by international institutions, I personally feel that the killing of civilians by military action should also be viewed with a jaundiced eye, no matter what military (or naval, in the case of the Lusitania) logic can be seen to justify their deaths. In that sense, I'd argue that the burden of proof rests on the Bomber Command personnel, and not the museum.
16 April 2007
Yad Vashem Caption Controversy
In the end, it seems Monsignor Antonio Franco, the Papal ambassador to Israel, will attend a memorial service for the victims of the Nazi murder of Jews at the Yad Vashem Holocaust Museum. You can find the text of the caption quoted in this article.
Having written plenty of captions and short texts about historical subjects ranging from Scottish medieval history to the 9/11 Terror Attacks, I feel confident that I know how difficult it is to reduce a complex subject to a handful or two of words. In this case, my sympathies lie with the Vatican. The caption about Pius XII seems to use the available information to place the former pope in the worst possible light. While I wouldn't call the information in question 34 here as kind to Pius XII, it does place his conduct in the context of the Catholic Church and other Christian religions institutions as a whole. Pius XII could indeed have done more, but I'm sure that's true of plenty of other people. This caption seems either calculated to offend or a ploy in order to achieve greater access to the Vatican archives. Either way, it's not good history.
Having written plenty of captions and short texts about historical subjects ranging from Scottish medieval history to the 9/11 Terror Attacks, I feel confident that I know how difficult it is to reduce a complex subject to a handful or two of words. In this case, my sympathies lie with the Vatican. The caption about Pius XII seems to use the available information to place the former pope in the worst possible light. While I wouldn't call the information in question 34 here as kind to Pius XII, it does place his conduct in the context of the Catholic Church and other Christian religions institutions as a whole. Pius XII could indeed have done more, but I'm sure that's true of plenty of other people. This caption seems either calculated to offend or a ploy in order to achieve greater access to the Vatican archives. Either way, it's not good history.
13 April 2007
Call for Photographs
Harper Collins in New Zealand plan to publish a book of First World War photographs intended to be definitive picture history of New Zealand involvement in the war. All the Dominions began establishing a real national identity during the Boer War and the First World War, and they are fortunate that this occurred in the photographic era. They were even luckier that cameras had become as portable as rifles! I'm hoping the publishers get a good response, and that we get some fascinating, previously unknown images.
12 April 2007
Rocket Science
For those traveling to Germany for a vacation, and willing to go off the tourists' beaten track, there's an opportunity to learn more about the Second World War V-weapons program on the island of Usedom at the Historical Technical Information Center there. The Center is opening a Memorial Landscape this summer that allows visitors to see the sites used for testing.
11 April 2007
Broken Arrow
One of the things that I noted during my hiatus was this gloomy perspective on the future of the Army. It's another piece of evidence in the case against the Bush administration for trying to fight a major overseas war on the cheap. At the end of the day, all the talk about supporting our fighting men and women overseas is useless unless it is backed up by the necessary sacrifices on the home front. If average Americans don't want to make those sacrifices, then there is no choice but to reduce engagements abroad.
10 April 2007
Missing in Action
Well, a variety of factors have kept me from blogging for the past month. I'm hoping that regular posts will resume more or less as of now. For the moment, I'd like to note that this book has received a big boost in sales owing to this film. Which is a shame because I think this book covers the topic better. However, if you like Ernle Bradford, I'd recommend this book, which I found entertaining many years ago in the 1970s.
29 March 2007
Rescue Ship
I found a new blog, duly added to my roll, and an interesting note about the future of HMCS Sackville, which people have been able to visit in Halifax, Nova Scotia, but maybe not for much longer.
Edited 10/iv/07
I messed up the link originally, but it should work now.
Edited 10/iv/07
I messed up the link originally, but it should work now.
27 March 2007
What Kind of War
An interesting piece of news analysis reports on the new American strategy in Iraq, taking troops out of the secure bases on the outskirts of towns and redistributing them in 'penny packets' within urban areas. I find it curious they bring up the French experience in Algeria, which while seemingly succesful, proved a public-relations disaster on so many levels.
Unfortunately for the Army, I think the War in Iraq is rapidly turning into a conflict where the operational approach is increasingly irrelevant to victory. The original mission was clear-cut: take out Saddam Hussein. Now it's muddled. Construct a regime that will not be influenced by those hostile to America's interests in the Middle East (Iranian-backed Shias), nor can be tainted by the anti-democratic regimes of Iraq's past (minority Sunni rule), but will not threaten our close allies (hated Israel and the fossilized Saudi monarchy), and will keep the oil flowing (avoid an all-out civil war).
Unfortunately for the Army, I think the War in Iraq is rapidly turning into a conflict where the operational approach is increasingly irrelevant to victory. The original mission was clear-cut: take out Saddam Hussein. Now it's muddled. Construct a regime that will not be influenced by those hostile to America's interests in the Middle East (Iranian-backed Shias), nor can be tainted by the anti-democratic regimes of Iraq's past (minority Sunni rule), but will not threaten our close allies (hated Israel and the fossilized Saudi monarchy), and will keep the oil flowing (avoid an all-out civil war).
06 March 2007
Mosier vs the British, Round One
Yesterday, I wrote a little about John Mosier's controversial The Myth of the Great War. I decided to make a full reconnaissance into the book, and read the chapter on the Battle of the Marne straight through, rather than rely on the sampling of shorter sections I'd done previously.
On the basis of this chapter, I'd have to say the fury with which Britons have greeted Mosier's work is an overreaction. For English-language readers, the role played by the French in the war has always been understated. No matter how much the British suffered, the French had it worse. The lead review on the Amazon page linked above is particularly egregious in wanting to focus, yet again, on Neuve Chappelle and Vimy Ridge, where the British fought, in spite of the considerable coverage this attack has received compared with the French attack in the Vosges.
That said, the end of the Battle of the Marne chapter really seems to verge on German propaganda. The Germans, short of ammunition, with extended supply lines, and not enough troops to secure them, retreat, but Mosier appears to want us to regard this as "an advance to the rear". The chapter itself discusses battles around Verdun where stout French resistance halts the Germans, and it is subsequent to this that German officers decide to withdraw to a more easily defended position. While the Marne campaign may not have been the "miracle of Marne" of Allied belief, I see no reason to excuse the Germans from having experienced a major setback.
However, the cry of rage emanating from the British Corps of Historians seems unwarranted. That Mosier minimizes the role of the BEF, while promoting a lesser-known Franco-German combat far from Paris, is a matter I would have thought worthy of further discussion, not wholesale censure. Round One to Mosier, I think, on points.
On the basis of this chapter, I'd have to say the fury with which Britons have greeted Mosier's work is an overreaction. For English-language readers, the role played by the French in the war has always been understated. No matter how much the British suffered, the French had it worse. The lead review on the Amazon page linked above is particularly egregious in wanting to focus, yet again, on Neuve Chappelle and Vimy Ridge, where the British fought, in spite of the considerable coverage this attack has received compared with the French attack in the Vosges.
That said, the end of the Battle of the Marne chapter really seems to verge on German propaganda. The Germans, short of ammunition, with extended supply lines, and not enough troops to secure them, retreat, but Mosier appears to want us to regard this as "an advance to the rear". The chapter itself discusses battles around Verdun where stout French resistance halts the Germans, and it is subsequent to this that German officers decide to withdraw to a more easily defended position. While the Marne campaign may not have been the "miracle of Marne" of Allied belief, I see no reason to excuse the Germans from having experienced a major setback.
However, the cry of rage emanating from the British Corps of Historians seems unwarranted. That Mosier minimizes the role of the BEF, while promoting a lesser-known Franco-German combat far from Paris, is a matter I would have thought worthy of further discussion, not wholesale censure. Round One to Mosier, I think, on points.
05 March 2007
"The Myth of the Great War" - the Lusitania
This was the title of a 2001 book by John Mosier, not a military historian but a professor of English with an interest in military history. I remember when it came out as being somewhat controversial among British reviewers. (It goes completely against the 'party line' among British historians concerning the BEF.) It did garner a Pulitzer Prize nomination, not that that's necessarily a recommendation, given the manipulation of American publishing prizes.
You'll find a very negative discussion of it by some Brits here. Unfortunately, these comments are long on indignation and short on specific criticism, which I always find is an almost certain indication that the book makes a valued contribution to our understanding of the subject! However, the lead review at the Amazon link quoted above makes some pointed criticisms that should lead one to approach Mosier's book with caution.
Anyway, I'm not in a position to offer a criticism at the moment, never having read it. I'm here to offer a quote that in the circumstances of my "Wilson's War" obsession I found worth including here:
You'll find a very negative discussion of it by some Brits here. Unfortunately, these comments are long on indignation and short on specific criticism, which I always find is an almost certain indication that the book makes a valued contribution to our understanding of the subject! However, the lead review at the Amazon link quoted above makes some pointed criticisms that should lead one to approach Mosier's book with caution.
Anyway, I'm not in a position to offer a criticism at the moment, never having read it. I'm here to offer a quote that in the circumstances of my "Wilson's War" obsession I found worth including here:
The extent of the aid given before America's formal declaration of war has traditionally been passed over in silence. Neither Allied apologists nor American defenders of President Wilson have been anxious to draw attention to the massive level of American support...Bryan, Wilson's first secretary of state, genuinely wanted America to remain neutral, but he was undercut at every turn, and resigned in protest over the handling of the Lusitania sinking...when a senator pointed out - correctly - that the Lusitania was carrying armaments to Great Britain, he was saved from impeachment only by the testimony of the Harbor Master of the Port of New York. [pp 304-305]
27 February 2007
Binh Gia
I'm editing a book about the Vietnam War at the moment, and while checking some facts over the Internet I came across this account about the Battle of Binh Gia in December 1964. There's also some interesting contemporary anaylsis toward the end of this description of airmobile operational doctrinal developments.
Between the Lines
I find the concept of parapolitics "a system or practice of politics in which accountability is consciously diminished" useful for understanding something like this. Study this article carefully, and here is what you see:
a) The source of the rumour is British.
b) The British prime minister has expressed a view that coincides with the view of the potential resignees.
c) A Pentagon source appears to have been selectively quoted; his or her views could easily be contrary to the rumour.
One could easily conclude that this is a British signal to the Bush administration to lay off Iran, that the British cannot be counted on to support an attack. It could even be a call by the British to anyone in the American military with misgivings about an attack on Iran to look to them for help.
Articles like this always make me suspicious of neatly packaged historical descriptions. Real life is a lot more messy.
a) The source of the rumour is British.
b) The British prime minister has expressed a view that coincides with the view of the potential resignees.
c) A Pentagon source appears to have been selectively quoted; his or her views could easily be contrary to the rumour.
One could easily conclude that this is a British signal to the Bush administration to lay off Iran, that the British cannot be counted on to support an attack. It could even be a call by the British to anyone in the American military with misgivings about an attack on Iran to look to them for help.
Articles like this always make me suspicious of neatly packaged historical descriptions. Real life is a lot more messy.
19 February 2007
Loose Change 1917 or Loose Change 1941?
Silence is golden, unless you're a blogger. I've been diverted by a variety of other matters the past week, mostly preparing for the sale of my house and getting some major dental work.
The BBC showed a documentary about conspiracy theories concerning the events of 9/11, 2001, last night. The main target was the now famous Loose Change video. Unfortunately, I fell asleep part-way through, but I saw enough to realize the BBC film made cogent points in support of the gang of terrorists “conspiracy” as opposed to the U.S. government “conspiracy”. There’s one caveat to this, however, which is that the programme suggested strongly the likelihood of a cover-up of the pre-strike intelligence analysis.
It isn’t the first time that a surprise attack on America has been the subject of a conspiracy theory. Howard Baker’s famous Watergate interrogation “What did the president know and when did he know it?” would have been very appropriate for Michigan senator Homer Ferguson.
In fact, the whole question of the validity of conspiracy theories is of far greater import to the general reader, as opposed to the “professional historian”. The latter has no choice but to discount such theories, since there is rarely any evidence in the form of letters or minutes or notes to sustain the idea that, for example, President Roosevelt knew the Japanese were coming, or that Robert Lansing worked for American entry into the war against the Kaiser. There wouldn’t be, would there, ripostes the person more familiar with chit-chat in the corridors of power. I’ll return to this matter in the light of the work of a totally discredited “popular historian”, the notorious David Irving, as I start a new strand on this blog.
The BBC showed a documentary about conspiracy theories concerning the events of 9/11, 2001, last night. The main target was the now famous Loose Change video. Unfortunately, I fell asleep part-way through, but I saw enough to realize the BBC film made cogent points in support of the gang of terrorists “conspiracy” as opposed to the U.S. government “conspiracy”. There’s one caveat to this, however, which is that the programme suggested strongly the likelihood of a cover-up of the pre-strike intelligence analysis.
It isn’t the first time that a surprise attack on America has been the subject of a conspiracy theory. Howard Baker’s famous Watergate interrogation “What did the president know and when did he know it?” would have been very appropriate for Michigan senator Homer Ferguson.
In fact, the whole question of the validity of conspiracy theories is of far greater import to the general reader, as opposed to the “professional historian”. The latter has no choice but to discount such theories, since there is rarely any evidence in the form of letters or minutes or notes to sustain the idea that, for example, President Roosevelt knew the Japanese were coming, or that Robert Lansing worked for American entry into the war against the Kaiser. There wouldn’t be, would there, ripostes the person more familiar with chit-chat in the corridors of power. I’ll return to this matter in the light of the work of a totally discredited “popular historian”, the notorious David Irving, as I start a new strand on this blog.
09 February 2007
Three generations
'The current cost of occupation in Iraq is $12 billion dollars per month, and we may need to remain in the region for the next 25-50 years.'
This comment comes from this article, and probably as a bald statement of fact would seem shocking to many Americans. 50 years? A war we intend to bequeathe to our great-grandchildren?
What's 2007-1945? 62 years.
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